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ABstrACt
This is a paper in normative moral philosophy, addressing 
the problem of the respect of persons regarding the 
activity of criticism. The question is whether the activity 
of criticism should be considered a moral duty or simply 
a moral choice? If it is a moral duty, the further question 
is what, when, and how should we criticize someone if 
we are required by the moral law to respect persons? 
I discuss six potential arguments regarding this question, 
and argue that only one of them is satisfactory and should 
be set as the standard or the foundation of the morality of 
criticism. That is, we should criticize someone with the 
motive of love. I also argue that the criticism virtue would 
be possible only under the principle of moral particularism, 
in which this paper means the idea that we all have different 
roles in fulfilling our moral duties which are the same for 
everyone, and these different roles are determined by the 
actual identity of the person.
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introduction: moral philosophy vs. political philosophy
How we should criticize one another? Are there moral guidelines for 
personal criticism? According to liberal political philosophy, individuals 
should be able to criticize someone as they want, given that they do not 
harm others physically. The respect of persons, according to this view, is 
simply the protection of persons from any physical violence, or as we all 
know it as the harm principle. Some contemporary liberals may further 
argue that hate speech should be added to the harm principle, and should 
be prohibited by law. But this paper will limit itself to moral philosophy 
rather than political philosophy. The difference is that while the former 
asks the question of what, when, and how individuals should behave in 
a particular situation, the latter only asks what individuals should do in 
their private sphere. 
We often accept that individuals should be able to criticize 
someone; given that they do not harm others physically or engage in hate 
speech. But we may also argue that we should be careful not to criticize 
someone at all. The respect of persons in political sense is simply that we 
do not harm others according to law, but the law does not require that we 
must respect them. Under the law, we may hate and criticize others for 
the sake of our benefits, and exploit them in the sense that we view and 
treat them as our enemies or competitors. 
In other words, the respect of persons in the political sense is to 
abide by the law (the harm principle) imposed on every individual only 
in the public sphere, not in private sphere. But the respect of persons in 
moral sense is much more than that. Sometimes we may be required by 
the moral law to view and treat someone not as a means but as an end in 
themselves. Therefore, respect of persons in moral sense is much more 
demanding and complicated than that of political sense. The main question 
of this paper is this: what, when, and how should we criticize someone 
if we are required by the moral law to respect persons? 
This paper consists of two sections. The first section is morality 
of criticism. I will argue that there are six main meanings and practices, 
and only one of them is satisfactory. The second section will argue that 
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even though criticism is a virtue and duty of individuals, this virtue should 
be perceived through moral particularism, that treats individuals not as 
individuals as such but as particular persons with certain identity, rather 
than consider them in an abstract sense.
section i  the foundation of the morality of Criticism
Kantian moral theory teaches us to treat other people as ends 
in themselves. For instance, Kant (1797) argues that we do not respect 
persons as an ends in themselves if we lie to them even for the sake of 
the greater good; to lie to them is to use them as a means. To treat one 
another morally we do not need to take other persons’ ends into account 
at all; instead we are simply required to respect their capacities of choices 
or ends; we are required by the moral law to help and assist other people 
not because doing so would help them fulfill the good life in one way or 
another, but because doing so would fulfill our own moral duty required 
by the moral law. 
Even though Kant talks about a good will, this does not mean that 
everyone who has a good will must help others for the sake of helping 
them achieve the good life but must help others for the sake of the moral 
law itself. We may be motivated to help others by our sense of sympathy 
or any other motivations, but the only motive required for the moral law 
is duty to the moral law itself. Kant does not argue that a person with 
a good will must abandon his or her sense-based motives (e.g. love, 
sympathy, etc.) at all, but that a person with a good will must always be 
motivated by the moral duty itself, while other sense-based motives are 
simply our own moral choices rather than moral duties, as Kant writes 
that “it is very beautiful to do good to human beings from love for them 
and from compassionate benevolence, or to be just from love of order; 
but this is not yet our conduct’s genuine moral maxim appropriate to our 
station among rational beings as human beings, when with proud conceit 
we presume – as volunteers, as it were – to brush aside the thought of 
duty and, as independent of command, to want to do merely from our 
own pleasure what we would need no command to do.” 
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In contras t, communitarian moral theory, drawing overwhelmingly 
from Sandel’s thought, teaches us that the respect of persons is to take 
their choices and ends into account seriously. We should support others to 
fulfill their ends if it leads them to the good life, and we should discourage 
them if it does not. According to this view, we are required by the moral 
law to help others not only with the motive to respect the moral law itself, 
but also with other motives such as sympathy, love, and commitment; 
these motivations are not simply our choices but our moral duties in the 
first place; we must respect other people not only for the sake of the moral 
law itself, but also for the sake of the good life of those others.
Another moral theory is what I would call a “utilitarian” moral 
theory. Utilitarianism” usually refers to the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham 
and John Stuart Mill, which argues that the right thing to do is to maximize 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number in the short term (Bentham) 
and in the long term (Mill), my choice of naming a moral theory I will 
discuss shortly as utilitarian moral theory may be not a good choice 
because what I mean by “utilitarian” here simply refers to the idea that 
we should do things for the sake of our own utility rather than the utility 
of others. According to utilitarian moral theory in my own term, we are 
required by the moral law to respect persons only to the extent that we 
do not harm them physically, but we are free to treat them merely as a 
means for our own ends; we may respect other people simply for the sake 
of the good life of ourselves.
Now the question is what we can learn from the three moral theories 
above? I would propose that what we can learn from them is that there 
are three motives regarding the respect of persons: (1) to respect persons 
is to act for the sake of the moral law itself (Kantian moral theory), (2) 
to respect persons is to act for the sake of the good life of those persons 
themselves (Communitarian moral theory), and (3) to respect persons is 
to act for the sake of the utility of ourselves, given that we do not harm 
others physically (Utilitarian moral theory). And there are two options 
(actions) regarding criticism: (1) to ignore or not criticize other persons, 
and (2) to criticize other persons. For the sake of simplicity, I summarize 
all of these in the following figure:




(1) To ignore 
persons
For the sake of the moral 
law itself
(2) To speak our 
minds




(3) To ignore 
persons
For the sake of the good 
life of others
(4) To speak our 
minds




(5) To ignore 
persons
For the sake of the utility 
of ourselves
(6) To speak our 
minds
For the sake of the utility 
of ourselves
 
Now we have six actions regarding the activity of criticism, 
inspired by three moral theories. I will discuss these six actions in turn, 
and argue that only action (4) is satisfactory and required by the moral 
law. However it should be clear that this does not mean that those thinkers 
(such as Kant, Sandel, and so on) actually support my arguments, but 
I simply borrow their ideas to lay out the framework of my arguments. 
For example, when I argue that Kantian moral theory supports action (1) 
and (2), I do not mean that Kant actually thinks so or explicitly says as 
I would argue; instead I simply want to show how, according to the logic 
of Kant’s argument on the respect of persons, his moral thinking can be 
applied to the question of the morality of criticism.
Let’s begin with action (1): we are required by the moral law to 
ignore other persons choices for the sake of the moral law itself. The 
reasoning is that a good will requires us to respect any choices other 
people make, regardless of whether those choices are really good for 
themselves; if we criticize them about the way they choose or their 
choices themselves, then we use them as a means for our ends because 
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we use our own particular conception of the good as the criterion to judge 
other people’s ends. For example, if someone asks us if his or her dress 
is beautiful, then, according to the logic of action (1), we should say 
neither because giving our opinion is to use our own criterion to judge 
other people’s choices and to not respect their capacity of choice. We are 
doing more than what the moral law requires us to do.
Action (2) argues that we are required by the moral law to speak 
our minds regarding other persons choices for the sake of the moral law 
itself. The logic of this argument is this: a good will requires us to respect 
our own thinking, regardless of whether and how our thinking would 
affect other people’s sentiments and even our own utility. According to 
this view, to respect persons is to treat them as an ends in themselves 
rather than as a means, and to speak our minds is to speak the truth, and 
to speak the truth is to treat them as an ends rather than as a means for our 
own ends. For instance, if someone asks us if his or her dress is beautiful, 
then, according to the logic of action (2), we should say that it is beautiful 
only if we really think so, and that it is not only if we do not really think 
so. We speak the truth according to our real thinking not because we want 
to hurt or please them for our own benefit or even for their own benefit, 
but because we want to respect the moral law that dictates to us to speak 
our minds. We show the respect to other persons only if we speak the 
truth so that other persons would know what we really think of them; they 
would not feel that they are being used by us for other ends.
Action (3) argues that we are required by the moral law not to 
criticize others for their decisions because only they know what will lead 
to the good life for them. The logic of this argument is this: the respect 
of persons is not only to respect their capacity of choice but also their 
choices themselves; we must think that, whatever are their choices, they 
always choose the good for themselves. For example, if someone asks 
us if his or her dress is beautiful, then, according to the logic of action 
(3), we should not give an opinion. This argument differs from action 
(1) suspends judgement to obey the moral law itself; while action (3) 
suspends judgement concerning others’ choices. 
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Action (4) argues that we are required by the moral law to speak 
our minds regarding other persons for the sake of the good life of those 
persons. The logic of this argument is this: we should respect other persons 
by encouraging them to live the good life and preventing them from any 
choices that would undermine their good lives. In this view, sometimes 
we should speak our minds along with encouraging them to be confident 
on their own choices only if their confidence on those choices contribute 
to the good life. For instance, if someone asks us if his or her dress is 
beautiful, then, according to the logic of action (4), we should say that 
it is beautiful or not only if we really think so. We are motivated by our 
sympathy and desire to see them live the good life. One may question if 
why we could not do this in action (2)? The answer is that because action 
(2) argues that we should do things for the sake of the moral law itself, 
while other motivations are simply our choices rather than our moral 
duties, so action (2) does not compel us to say that he or she should be 
confident on his or her choice of dress; we may choose to say it but it is 
not required by the moral law. In contrast, action (4) compels us to both 
speak our minds and be sympathetic with other persons; the motivation 
of sympathy is our moral duty rather than our free choice.
Action (5) argues that we are not required by the moral law, and 
we are free to ignore other persons for the sake of the utility of ourselves. 
The logic of this argument is this: given that we do not harm other people 
physically, we are free to use others as a means for our own ends, and we 
should ignore others because this is an efficient way to gain the highest 
utility for ourselves. 
Action (6) argues that we are not required by the moral law, and 
we are free to speak our minds regarding other persons for the sake of the 
utility of ourselves. The logic of this argument is this: given that we do not 
harm other people physically, we are free to use others as a means for our 
own ends, and we should criticize others because this is an efficient way 
to gain the highest utility for ourselves. We feel happy when criticizing 
others, whether or not our criticism is beneficial to those people, or to 
society as a whole. As long as we do not harm them physically, we should 
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be able to do so.
I have discussed all six arguments. Now I will show why only 
action (4) is satisfactory and compatible with the respect of persons and 
should be set as the standard of the moral law regarding criticism (the 
morality of criticism). What makes our action moral or immoral depend 
on the combination of the right action and our motives: Doing the right 
thing for the right reason [Morality = (right) Action + (right) Motive]. 
A motive is a right reason. Our action can be moral only if we 
convey certain reason to it. In this sense motive is indispensable for our 
moral actions since we cannot do the right thing for the wrong reason/
motive. The question is what is the right motive to respect persons 
regarding the activity of criticism? I have discussed three different 
motives: the motive to respect the moral law itself, the motive to love 
other people, and the motive to love ourselves. As we can see that the 
motive to love ourselves is not, indeed, required by the moral law, but it 
is rather our free choice, this motive is not the right motive/reason that 
makes criticism moral in the first place. According to this motive, there 
is no such thing as a morality of criticism because everyone is free to 
convey any reason to criticism; in other words, there is no foundation of 
the morality of criticism in the first place. Apart from that, this motive also 
uses people as a means for our own ends, which is clearly incompatible 
with the respect of persons. According to action (5), we simply do not 
criticize other people not because we really admire their choice nor even 
respect their capacity of choice, but because we treat them as a source of 
our own utility; we do not treat them as a person but as a thing we can 
use for our own ends. It would be very odd to suggest that this motive 
should become the moral law or morality of criticism because if this is 
the case, then the notion that everyone is an end in themself and deserves 
our respect would be replaced by the notion that everyone is merely a 
means to be used and underserving of our respect.
Let’s consider our relationship to someone who has irrational or 
even destructive beliefs in the supernatural. Should we criticize their 
beliefs and choices? According to the motive of action (1), we would 
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keep silent because we do not want to undermine their autonomy, so we 
would rather leave them alone. According to the motive of action (2), we 
would be required to criticize them by the moral law to tell them the truth, 
despite this may make them feel bad. I do not think that these two actions 
(1 and 2) should become the standard of the morality of criticism because 
even though they aim to respect persons as an ends in themselves, their 
understanding and perception of the person is too abstract: they exclude 
consideration of all ends of the individual person. 
In other words, they simply respect persons as pure and abstract 
individuals rather than as emotional and concrete individuals who are 
motivated by different desires, different conceptions of the good life, and 
different social positions. The great difference is that while the respect of 
persons as abstract individuals gives us the feeling that we are respected 
only because we are simply abstract human beings, the respect of persons 
as concrete individuals gives us the feeling that we are respected because 
we are unique and different from others. I would argue that only the second 
meaning gives true respect to persons.
I propose that the right motive of criticism must be the motive of 
love. At first glance, this proposal seems paradoxical because criticism 
seems to be the activity that makes someone feel bad, while love seems 
to be the activity that makes someone feel good. How could we criticize 
someone with the motive of love? I propose that this is possible only if 
we embrace the meaning of love in a deeper sense: to love someone is to 
wish them the good life. This definition of love is not to make someone 
feel good and stronger in a short term, but to encourage them to pursue the 
good life. Therefore it is necessary to criticize someone when we see that 
they are deviating from the good life. And we can know whether someone 
is deviating from the good life only if we know what the good life of a 
particular person is, and we must take their unique ends and interests into 
account. We cannot take their interests and ends into account seriously if 
we do not love them first, as Frankfurt (2004, p.37) argues that “loving 
someone or something essentially means or consists in, among other 
things, taking its interests as reasons for acting to serve those interests. 
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Love is itself, for the lover, a source of reasons. It creates the reasons by 
which his acts of loving concern and devotion are inspired.”
In this sense, action (3) and (4) come closer to the morality of 
criticism as they assert that the motive of criticism (or not criticism) is 
our love and sympathy with other people. Their perception of the person 
is significantly different from action (1) and (2) in that they aim to respect 
not only the (pure) self but also their ends and goals. However, I would 
argue that only action (4) is compatible with the morality of criticism. 
According to action (3), we should not criticize someone even if we want 
to because if we do so, then we would undermine their good life as we 
believe that anything they choose and pursue is always good for them. In 
contrast, according to action (4), we should criticize someone if we see 
that he or she is doing something harmful to his or her good life; in this 
view, it is possible that someone else might know better than us about 
the good life of ourselves. 
 
section ii  the Criticism virtue and moral particularism
In the last section I have argued that the morality of criticism 
must be based on the motive to love other people, and take his or her 
interests and ends into account seriously before we criticize them. In this 
sense we not only love individuals as such but also recognize them as 
emotional and concrete individuals. The problem is that we are required 
by the moral law to treat equally. But this is impossible in theory and 
practice. While it is easy to see the practical difficulties, I will focus on 
the theoretical difficulties of treating everyone equally. The identity of 
the person is crucial, and the moral theory I would like to introduce for 
this task is what I call “moral particularism.” 
Moral particularism is often interpreted as the idea that there is no 
such thing as a universal moral principle; instead different communities 
have different understandings of what the morality is, so each community 
has its own standard of morality; a particular action may be a virtue in a 
particular community but may be a vice in another particular community. 
However, in this paper, I do not use “moral particularism” that way; instead 
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what I mean by “moral particularism” is generally the idea that we all 
have different roles in fulfilling our moral duties which are the same for 
everyone, and these different roles are determined by the actual identity 
of the person, including our community. 
My argument is that there are two orders of morality: the first-order 
morality is concerned about the question of “what is the right thing to 
do?” and the second-order morality is the question of “whom should we 
do the right thing to in particular?” For instance, the first-order morality 
may tell us that we have moral duty to help others, and the second-order 
morality may further tell us that our moral duty to help others is in our 
own communities. It is important to understand that moral particularism, 
is a second-order morality, while criticizing someone with a motive of 
love is a first-order. So I would propose that we should use our more 
energy to criticize someone who is closer to us in terms of commitment 
and identity in a particular situation than to someone else who is more 
distant from us.
It is noteworthy that a “particular situation” is a keyword here. 
Without it, we may mistakenly think that we must always do the right 
thing only to those who are closer to us, which surely causes a conceptual 
confusion because there is no universal criterion that tells us who else is 
closer to us. This can be family, neighbors, nationals, etc. Eventually this 
will lead to the failure of the moral duty unless we introduce a standard 
of judgement: we can know to whom we should have more moral duty 
with only if we know the situation we are encountering at the moment. 
For example, if we are in a situation where we are required by the 
moral law to help two drowning children, one is our own child, another is 
not, the question is, given that we have time and capacity to help only one 
child, who should we help first? According to the second-order morality, 
our moral duty should go first to our own child because of his or her 
closer commitment and identity to us; in this case we cannot claim either 
that our moral duty would be equally urgent to both of them or that our 
moral duty should go first to someone else who is even closer to us than 
our own child because someone else is out of our particular situation at 
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the moment. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we should help only 
our own children; in fact, we are required by the moral law to help them 
all, but our moral duty to our own child is more urgent and demanding 
than that to another child.
When it comes to the activity of criticism, we also must ask if, 
given that we cannot criticize everyone with the motive of love equally, 
who we should offer our criticism? One might question why we must 
we focus our criticism, rather than criticizing everyone equally? I would 
say that this is because the activity of criticism with the motive of love 
is something we need to put our much energy into it; we need to take 
interests and ends of the person we love into account seriously so that we 
can know what is good and what is bad for them, in which it is impossible 
to do for everyone. 
Let’s consider the love between parents and children. Parents who 
really love their children must take their children’s interests and ends into 
account very seriously so that they can know what is good and what is 
bad for the life of their children. These parents may love children of their 
neighbors and also wish them the good life, but their moral duty to their 
own children must be more urgent and demanding. They are required 
to criticize their own children even if sometimes they know that doing 
so would make both them and their children hurt and disturbed, but as a 
good parent, they must do so with the motive of love.
Another good example would be the criticism of our own nation. It 
is mistakenly held by some nationalists and conservatives that we should 
not criticize our own nation as this always reflects the disrespect of our 
nation. I would argue that, indeed, just the opposite is true. It is not only 
possible but also necessary that we have a moral duty to criticize our own 
nation in several issues such as economics, politics, cultures, traditions, 
educations, and so on. This is based upon the motive of love.
The virtue of criticism is a moral duty; sometimes to fail to criticize 
someone is to fail to do our moral duty. Sometimes we may choose not 
to criticize our loved one just because we do not want to be criticized in 
return, but this may be a vice rather than a virtue because it suggests that we 
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love ourselves more than our loved one. Of course, as Frankfurt suggests, 
it is necessary to love ourselves more than everyone else, but sometimes 
we have to negotiate between the benefits our loved one would receive 
from our criticism and the costs we would receive from being criticized. 
Recalling the main question of this paper: What, when, and how 
should we criticize someone if we are required by the moral law to respect 
persons in a moral sense? It is difficult to reduce such an argument to a 
simple statement, since as Hegel argues that philosophers need to show 
how exactly the development of philosophical ideas unfold. However, 
if I have to try, I would put it this way: We should criticize someone 
with the motive of love (how). We should criticize when we see others 
deviating from the good life (when), and we should offer them better 
alternatives (what).
Conclusion
This is a paper in normative moral philosophy rather than 
normative political philosophy, whatever suggestions and arguments 
I would propose in this paper is simply a moral suggestion rather than a 
political or legal suggestion. I have addressed the problem of the respect 
of persons regarding the activity of criticism. The question is if the activity 
of criticism should be a moral duty or simply a moral choice? and if it 
is a moral duty, the further question is what, when, and how should we 
criticize someone if we are required by the moral law to respect persons 
in a moral sense? I have discussed six potential arguments regarding this 
question, and argue that only one of them is satisfactory and should be set 
as the standard or the foundation of the morality of criticism. That is, we 
should criticize someone with the motive of love and wishes the person 
whom we criticize the good life. I have also argued that the criticism 
virtue would be possible only if we are governed by the principle of moral 
particularism, in which this paper means the idea that we all have different 
roles in fulfilling our moral duties which are the same for everyone, and 
these different roles are determined by the actual identity of the person.
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